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Abstract
Developing explanations of observed phenomenon is one of the major functions of research
in Information Systems (IS). But what is an explanation? What types of explanation can IS
research provide and what do they mean? The objectives of this research are to develop a
shared language, to increase understanding of the meaning of research results and to
stimulate discussion of explanation in Information Systems research. Four years of articles
published in two top-ranked IS journals over a period of ten years were sampled based on
four explanation types defined in modern philosophy: covering-law, statistical-relevance,
pragmatic and functional. Explanation types, sub classifications ontologies and research
methods were classified and the relationships between these characteristics were examined.
Results reveal opportunities for studying Information Systems beyond a single explanation,
towards the use of a rich set of explanation types to fully describe phenomena.
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Introduction
“A fundamental aim of science is to provide explanations of natural phenomenon”
(Salmon 1989b, p.4). If the field of Information Systems (IS) is considered a science, it can be
inferred that investigation into observations of IS phenomena is intended to result in an
explanation. Some researchers point out the differences between the natural sciences and the
technological or “sciences of the artificial.” (Simon 1969; Bunge 1979). Simon (1969) suggests
that the explanation of artificial environments, like information systems, is built on the
combination of prescribed explanation types from both natural (physiological) and artificial
(computer science) reference disciplines. He states that “the relation between physiological and
information-processing explanations will become just like the relations between quantummechanical and physiological explanations in biology (or the relation between solid-state physics
and programming explanations in computer science)” and that the two explanations “constitute
two linked levels” through which information systems are explained (Simon 1969, p. 97). Bunge
states that “determination is often multiple and probabilistic rather than simple and linear”
(Bunge 1979, p. 270) and that some sciences focus on structure and behavior and others focus on
composition and mechanism. We argue that this prescription of explanation types for specific
scientific disciplines limits our understanding of phenomena. Instead, we argue that the
interdisciplinary field of Information Systems, built from both natural and artificial scientific
disciplines, relies on the mixing of explanation types from reference disciples through which
research phenomena are understood and research agendas are shaped.
This leads to the research question, “what types of explanation can IS research provide
and what do they mean?” The value of examining the types of explanation is not obvious as we
all have an intuitive understanding of “explanation.” For example, everyone has a common
understanding of what it means to explain a game – we describe the rules. We explain that the
driveway is wet because it rained. A nursery rhyme explains, “the kingdom was lost and all for
the want of a horseshoe nail” (Owen 1989). We explain the length of the shadow by the height of
the tower that casts it (Van Fraassen 1980). We explain that the behavioral intention to use an IT
artifact lies, in part, in its perceived usefulness (Davis 1989). These examples represent different
types of explanation, illustrate what explanation can provide, and show a need to clarify what an
explanation means in a research context.
One of the requirements for progress in any scientific field is the development of a
paradigm or disciplinary matrix composed of a coherent body of literature and terminology, a set
of methods and evaluative criteria, identified problems, models and exemplars (Kuhn 1962;
Kuhn 1977). Deeply held models define both a field’s ontology and its epistemology (Kuhn
1977), and determine the criteria for explanatory knowledge that provides scientific
understanding (Salmon 1989b). There has been no direct discussion in the IS literature regarding
the interpretation or meaning of research results – i.e. what type of explanation is the research
providing about the relationships between entities in the world? There is a need to examine how
IS purports to explain phenomena so a shared language and understanding can be developed to
evaluate research findings and strengthen paradigms.
To address these challenges we first examine how the Philosophy of Science has
informed the IS field about the nature of the world (ontology), and how knowledge is obtained
(epistemology). The relationship between the ontology and epistemology of IS is fundamental to
understanding the debate regarding the nature of scientific explanation (Salmon 1989b; Hunt
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1991). We identify the different types of explanation discussed in the literature and recognize
that each type was introduced as the universal definition of explanation in science, not as
typology of a coexisting set of categories. Therefore this paper focuses attention on the
differences between research explanations rather than a means of reducing these concepts to
categories (Deetz 1996).
Second, we survey the field of Information Systems and describe the types of explanation
used. Examination of the explanatory relationships entailed in research results benefits the IS
field in the same manner that critiques of ontologies, methods, techniques, and tools have been
valuable. Understanding of explanation in IS research may guide judgments about
inconsistencies in the literature and expose opportunities for triangulation. Alternative
explanations resulting from different theories or research approaches provide a means of
critiquing accepted theory above and beyond analysis of how well a theory reflects the facts. We
argue that from this perspective a “plurality of theories allows for a much sharper criticism of
accepted ideas than does the comparison with the domain of facts which are supposed to sit there
independently of theoretical considerations” (Feyerabend 1963, p. 923).
In the examination of the use of explanation in the IS field, we explore how explanation
in IS literature has changed during the past decade. In other research domains, a mature “system
of inquiry” is one that “sweeps in” variables, theories, epistemologies, and explanation types
from many disciplines to achieve progress in understanding phenomena (Churchman 1971). In
this system, when agreement is reached on explanation of a phenomenon, counter-hypotheses are
sought that “rock the boat, upset the apple-cart and encourage revolution and dissent…This is the
only pathway to reality: whenever we are confident that we have grasped reality, then begins the
new adventure to reveal our illusion and put us back again in the black forest” (Churchman 1971,
p. 199). A change in emphasis and broadening of what explanation types are provided by
research may indicate increasing maturity in the field and could reveal potential areas for future
research. Finally we argue that research can benefit from this analysis by enabling researchers to
identify and produce rich, multi-perspective explanations in the study of research phenomena
(Mingers 2001), contributing to broader scientific understanding.

Ontology Explanation Relationship
Philosophical positions regarding the nature of science and the role of explanation by
Karl Popper (1963), Carl Hemple (1962), Thomas Kuhn (1962), and Imre Lakatos (1973) have
influenced the language and approach of scientific research. Researchers in IS have adopted
many of the concepts from these traditions and have created a diverse set of ideas about what
constitutes good theory (Straub et al. 1995; Sutton and Staw 1995; Gregor 2002), the existence
and relevance of paradigms (Deetz 1996; Goles and Hirschheim 2000), the need to account for
causality (Markus and Robey 1988; Lee et al. 1997) and discussion of the positivist-interpretivist
dichotomy (Lee 1989; Lee 1991; Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991; Fitzgerald and Howcroft 1998).
IS research can be further informed by the field of philosophy in determining the nature
and requirements of an explanation. The criteria of what constitutes an explanation is rooted in
the beliefs about the nature of the world and the means of discovering knowledge which
underlies all research. Philosophers recognize the distinction between descriptive knowledge that
something occurred and explanatory knowledge why it occurred (Salmon 1989).
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Citing Aristotle (Physics II, Chapter 3), Ruben writes:
“Knowledge is the object of our inquiry, and men do not think they know until they have grasped
the 'why' of it... In one sense (1) that out of which a thing comes to be and which persists is called
‘explanation’...In another sense (2) the form or archetype... and its genera are called
‘explanations'. Again (3) the primary source of the change or coming to rest...Again (4) in a sense
of end or 'that for the sake of which' a thing is done.... are all ways in which the term 'explanation'
is used…. As the word has several senses, it follows that there are several explanations of the
same thing.” (Ruben, 1990, p. 78)

These early definitions of scientific explanation sought necessary and sufficient
conditions, including teleological (purpose; final cause), formal (abstract structure), material
(composition), and efficient (responsible agent) aspects of causation. Modern science focuses
almost exclusively on the latter two aspects, but more importantly, Hemple and Oppenheim
(1948) shifted the debate over the nature of scientific explanation to the position of explanations
as deductive arguments (Salmon 1989a). This shift toward a positivist approach has engendered
ongoing debate regarding theories and types of explanation in both the physical and social
sciences. This work defines a positivist ontology as “studies premised on the existence of prior
fixed relationships within the phenomena” (Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991, p. 5).
Although the tenants of the positivist ontology have been described differently (Salmon
1989b; Hunt 1991; Lee 1999), the original descriptions require that explanations rely on the
presence of general laws and are referred to as nomological or covering-law models (Salmon
1995b citing Hemple and Oppenheim 1948). Causal covering-law explanation is distinguished
by the co-occurrence of events by asserting that whenever X occurs under condition C, Y must
occur. Support for any theoretical covering-law results from continued confirmatory evidence
supplied under manipulated conditions intended to suppress or bring about the effect in question.
Different types of scientific explanations have gradually evolved to consider factors that are
relevant to the event but not sufficient or necessary. Other types of scientific explanations
emphasize the subject’s interpretation of the event or the context of the investigation.
The positivist ontology used in IS research often excludes human intentionality. This
may be due, in part, to the rejection of cognition, motivation, and learning by psychology in the
mid 20th century (Koch 1999). Yet Information Systems researchers are often interested in the
beliefs and values of people, in their intentional actions and their chosen patterns of use. In the
debate regarding the role of explanation in science, the proponents of nomological explanations
describe social science in terms of the inevitability of the relationship between causal forces and
behavioral outcome (Hemple 1996). The scientific validity of explanations referring to “mental”
factors has been questioned and these factors are thought to be reducible within a materialist
program (Salmon 1989a). Dissent with this view is based upon the complexity of human action
(Hayek 1996), the distinction between the subject matter of social science and the natural
sciences (Fay 1996), and the meaning of the behavior as viewed by the subject performing it
(Fay and Moon 1996). Social science seeks to account not only for what happened and how it
came about, but also the importance, meaning, and “why” the subject performed a specific action
(Fay and Moon 1996). The distinction between objective, subjective, and inter-subjective
research enables the differing aspects of the human world to be more completely understood
(Mingers 2001; McDonald 2002). The goal of many studies is to describe, predict, or intervene
in behavioral outcomes and the deeper understanding of why an action was performed requires
an intentional account and a need for interpretation. This attachment of meaning to the world by
the subjects has been termed the interpretative ontology (Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991; Lee
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1999) and is defined as research which assumes “that people create and associate their own
subjective and inter-subjective meaning as they interact with the world” (Orlikowski and Baroudi
1991, p. 5). Researchers may know that a statement was made and what the statement means, but
they do not know why the statement was made. In the interpretive ontology, researchers have an
incomplete explanation of the statement.
Finally, critical social theory was used to represent a supradisciplinary philosophical
perspective (Horkheimer 1972; Kellner 2001). The original purpose of critical social theory was
to explain society through historical and contextual references across various scientific
disciplines. Critical social theory seeks to explain social structures resulting in domination,
articulate human activity striving to transform society (Kellner 2001), and explore the production
of the false-consciousness (Agger 1991). A researcher using critical social theory is not
concerned with such familiar concepts as usefulness, performance, or productivity, but instead is
intent on explaining how influences guide individuals in their actions and describing individuals
as socially and contextually constructed actors upon their environment. Data are not intended to
prove or disprove theory but are used in understanding the regularities of process rather than
cross-sectional differences (Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991, p. 20).

Explanation Types
The philosophy of science presents formal descriptions and requirements of the
relationships entailed by explanations that differ from peoples’ everyday understanding. The past
two centuries of philosophical discussion have produced a complex set of theories and models of
explanation from which five major types can be extracted: descriptive/structural, covering-law,
statistical-relevance, pragmatic and functional (Table 1).
Descriptive/structural explanation can be characterized by the presentation of “objective” or
“factual” accounts of the phenomena with no theoretical grounding or interpretation (Orlikowski
and Baroudi 1991). Taxonomies, observations of an event and descriptions of the impact of an
information technology on an organization are examples of structural/descriptive explanations.
Covering-law explanation, is based upon Hemple’s (1962) Deductive-Nomological (D-N) and
Inductive-Statistical (I-S) models of explanation (Salmon 1989b). Covering-law models present
the logical relationship between the explanandum (the event to be explained) and the explanans
(the premise, including at least one general law). The suitability of both these models for
providing a basis for scientific explanation has been challenged based on counterexamples
noting the asymmetry of explanation1 and the arbitrariness of statistical occurrence 2 . Although
these two models have provided the fountainhead for discussion of explanation, the absence of
universal laws in IS makes application of covering-law models difficult as the basis for
explanation.

1

A falling barometer allows inference that there has been a drop in air pressure but the drop cannot be explained by referring to
the barometer. Rain will explain why a driveway is wet but a wet driveway doesn’t explain why it rained.
2
In an experiment with two outcomes, X and Y with p<.05 and >.05 respectively, enough trials will produce some instances of
Y. Therefore we can explain X but not Y.
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Statistical relevance explanation (S-R) allows for multiple factors of low probability to have
explanatory power (Salmon 1989a). S-R explanations was developed in response to criticism of
covering law models which relied on causal relationships in which one condition, X, causes the
occurrence of condition Y. But many IS phenomenon are influenced by a wide and variable set
of factors that operate differently under different conditions or in different combinations. The
role and identification of causal relationships and of necessary and sufficient conditions (Fay
1996) in explanation is extremely controversial. This is due in part to the multiplicity and
diversity of causes and the incompleteness of our knowledge of causal relationships. Causal
models are also prone to intuitive holes 3 and suffer from coexistence laws 4 . The influence of a
large number of casual factors leads to the use of statistical hypothesis testing and probabilistic
explanations. This overcomes the objection to covering-law models of explanation in which the
phenomenon to be explained must have a high probability of occurrence (Kitcher 1989).
Statistical techniques are used to indicate the amount of variance in an outcome measure which a
set of factors accounts for, and whether or not an hypothesis is significant at a pre-determined
level (Polanyi 1958). There are a wide variety of statistical analyses used in quantitative IS
research to explain the relationships between contributing factors and outcome measures.
Pragmatic explanation is the fourth type of explanation (van Fraassen 1980). A pragmatic
explanation is an answer to a why-question which involves not just the relationship between
theory and fact, but also the context (Salmon 1989b). This view incorporates the concept of
contrast-classes so that a question “Why X?” becomes “Why X rather than X*, X**….?” The
suitability of an explanation is dependent on both the context of the question and the purpose of
the questioner. In van Fraassen’s (1980) example of the explanation of the height of a tower, the
architect’s explanation would result in a description of the plans where the builder’s explanation
from might rely on the nature of the construction materials material and stability of the tower.
But the answer to a specific contrast question “Why is the height h rather than h*” reveals that
the length of the shadow cast by the building was important to the owner. This provides the
relevant explanation (Kitcher 1989) for that particular question. The relevant explanation
depends on who is asking the question and is specific to that particular question (Kitcher 1989).
A pragmatic explanation may create several new questions involving other contrast-classes,
which each have different explanations.
Functional explanation, the final type, accounts for cases where legitimate explanations are
provided by the end state or goals of a phenomenon (Salmon 1989b). First person descriptions of
behavior are frequently couched in these terms: e.g. “Why did I go to the store? To buy
spaghetti.” The future goal explains the event, based upon belief that the event will fulfill the
goal. The explanation is correct even if the store has no spaghetti. Simply stated, the
explanandum (to go to the store) is sufficient for the explanans (to buy spaghetti) given the
conditions, but the explanans does not necessarily entail the explanandum. One controversial
area relates to the problem of functional equivalents in which multiple mechanisms can bring
about the same result depending on the context. This form of functional explanation is counter to
the D-N model of explanation and significantly reduces the ability of functional explanations to
provide predictive or prescriptive explanations.
3

Even within Salmon’s “network of causal relations” we must identify which of the numerous antecedents actually caused the
phenomenon. This becomes intractable when a specific phenomenon occurs under a wide variety of non-overlapping conditions.
4
The Ideal Gas Law (PV=nRT) is a non-causal coexistence law which shows the relationship between pressure, volume, number
of gas particles and temperature. If this type of law can be used in explanations then causes are not invoked by all explanations.
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Explanation
Type
Descriptive/
Structural
Explanation

Covering-law
Explanation

Statistical
Relevance
Explanation
Pragmatic
Explanation
Functional
Explanation

Definition
Knowledge that a phenomenon occurs, a description of a phenomena,
taxonomies and classification scheme. Work involving no theoretical
grounding or interpretation of the phenomena; presentation of “objective,
factual” accounts of events to illustrate an issue of interest (Orlikowski and
Baroudi 1991, p.5).
An explanation of either the D-N or I-S type can be “described as an argument
to the effect that the event to be explained was to be expected by virtue of
certain explanatory facts” (Salmon 1989b, p.9). The explanatory facts must
contain at least one universal or statistical law.
“An explanation of a particular fact is an assemblage of facts statistically
relevant to the fact-to-be-explained regardless of the degree of probability that
results” (Salmon, 1989b, p.67).
An explanation is a context dependent answer to a “why-question” (Van
Fraassen 1980). Different explanations of the same instance will result from
different questions.
“Explanations that are framed in terms of ends or goals” (Salmon 1989b,
p.26). A given social practice[factor] has a certain effect. When it has that
effect, there is some causal mechanism that ensures A continues to exist.
When the practice stops having that effect, that mechanism stops working.

Table 1. Explanation Types
Explanation sub-classification
The explanation types described above are characterized by different relationships
between the phenomenon and the research outcome. Another distinction between explanations
found in the literature is based on scope and completeness of the explanation. Partial
explanations are concerned with explaining an event which is a sub-class of a larger phenomenon
(e.g. an explanation is provided for why a person purchased an item online but not for why they
chose a specific website) (Hunt 1991). Explanation sketches provide a general outline of a
phenomenon by identifying some variables that might be related to the event and may include
variables that the research determines are not related. Nomothetic explanation is used to explain
a class of phenomenon with a parsimonious selection of variables (e.g. the Technology Adoption
Model explains behavioral intention with two or three variables). Finally ideographic
explanations aim at a full explanation of a single event by describing any possible influence on
the phenomenon and context in question. These sub-classifications apply to all the explanation
types in § 3 and are presented in Table 2.
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SubClassification
Partial
Explanation
Explanation
Sketch
Nomothetic
Explanation
Ideographic
Explanation

Definition
“a proposed explanation is partial in the sense that [it] does not explain why k
occurred but only that some phenomenon of type G occurred and that k is a
subclass of G.” (Hunt 1991, p.91)
“An explanation sketch implies that only a general outline of the explanation
is offered” (i.e. here are some variables which might be related” [to the
phenomena in question] (Hunt 1991, p.91)
Seeks to parsimoniously explain a class of situations or events with just one or
a few explanatory factors (Babbie 1998, p.34).
Aims at full explanation of a single instance through the enumeration of the
numerous, perhaps unique, considerations that lie behind a given action
(Babbie 1998, p.34).

Table 2. Explanation Sub-Classifications
The Fit of Artifact Designs, Research Frameworks and Mathematical Models
Scientific interest in IS, driven by the pervasiveness and potential impact of information
technology, has taken different forms. Although strongly influenced by the natural sciences
model with its discovery and justification aspects (Hunt 1991; March and Smith 1995), IS
research may also be oriented around artifact design theories, the development of research
frameworks or predictive mathematical models (Gregor 2002).
Artifact design research apply knowledge of situations and tasks to create effective artifacts
(Simon 1969; March and Smith 1995). Design research fulfills a different purpose than studies
whose goal is discovery or justification of knowledge. Rather than producing general theoretical
knowledge, design frameworks apply knowledge “to create things which serve human purpose”
(March and Smith 1995, p. 253). These articles are technology oriented and the products are
judged against criteria of value and utility. This value-laden goal orientation differentiates these
studies from value neutral studies of discovery or justification (Bunge 1979).
Research frameworks recommend and motivate research in particular IS areas by identifying
specific research questions, presenting theoretical perspectives and prior literature and
suggesting dimensions or variable of interest and possible methodologies. This type of research
frequently integrates diverse or fragmented literature and models into a comprehensible
framework that provides guidance for future investigations.
Mathematical models present a challenge to the standard theories of explanation and have
largely been ignored in discussions regarding the nature of scientific explanation (Hafner and
Mancosu 2003). The development of non-Euclidian geometries by Riemann and Lobatschevsky
dispelled the tradition of mathematics as a-priori knowledge about the universe, which
necessarily models the physical world (Kitcher 1983). The literature in the philosophy of
mathematics now recognizes two distinct areas of mathematical explanation: the status of
mathematical explanations within the domain of mathematics (e.g. the ontological reality of
numbers; what mathematical proofs “explain”; for a review see Mancosu 2001; Hafner and
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Mancosu 2003) and secondly, what mathematical representation of physical events actually
explain.
This current research only concerns itself with the latter case because we view
mathematical representation as models, or “encapsulation of some slice of the real world within
the confines of the relationships constituting a formal mathematical system” (Casti 1992, p.1 ). A
model is thus the symbolic representation of some aspect of the modeler’s reality allowing
exploration of the reality mirrored within a formal symbolic system. The quality of the model
will depend on how well the observations of the phenomenon are characterized, which
observations are selected to form the subsystem of reality, and how the subsystem is encoded to
represent the phenomenon of concern. But models per se are not necessarily explanatory beyond
describing phenomenon and showing relationships. For example, physical models, such as
globes and scale models of objects, fit well into the category of descriptive explanation. Shapiro
remarked that “a scientific explanation of a physical event often amounts to no more than a
mathematical description of it” (Shapiro 2000, p. 34). Certainly there is something about the
material world that makes the tools of mathematics particularly applicable. But how does a
mathematical relationship make the physical world intelligible or “explain” a phenomenon? The
ability to predict and control aspects of the real world made possible by mathematical models
seems to indicate they are more than simple description. The issue of whether mathematical
models are a subset of descriptive explanation or another type of explanation represents a
difficult question.
The correspondence rules by which observations are represented in mathematical models
are critical because “clearly, a mathematical structure, description, model or theory cannot serve
as an explanation of a non-mathematical event without some account of the relationship between
mathematics per se and scientific reality” (Shapiro 2000, p. 35). So, the first criterion for
mathematical models to be considered explanatory of an event outside the realm of mathematics
is presentation of the correspondence rules by which the researcher “attaches symbolic
expressions to nature” (Kuhn 1977, p. 301). Without these operational definitions, mathematical
models are not explanatory outside their own constructs.
Another perspective on mathematical models is gained by contrasting them with the types
of explanations presented in §3. Statistical relevance explanation, which relies on mathematical
analysis of the probabilistic influence of factors on outcomes, might appear to be closely related
to mathematical models and invites close comparison. In science, all propositions rely on a set of
auxiliary assumptions. During the process of scientific inquiry, the failure of propositions to pass
critical tests may subject auxiliary assumptions to question and revision rather than cause
rejection of the over-arching theory (Lakatos 1973). In contrast, mathematical propositions, such
as 7+5 =12, are often considered necessary truths not subject to question. Central mathematical
beliefs do not undergo radical changes in understanding and auxiliary mathematical assumptions
are not revised. In addition, mathematical models are based upon proofs, which eliminate all
doubt, not just reasonable doubt, and generally do not contain probabilistic predictions of
outcomes (Shapiro 2000).
The relationship between mathematical models and pragmatic explanation is more
problematic. Whether explanations within mathematics can be answers to why-questions is the
subject of debate (for discussion see Resnik and Kushner 1987; Sandborg 1998). Additionally,
mathematical models do not account for the context and contrast-classes inherent in pragmatic
explanations. Although individual models could be argued to contain elements of pragmatic
explanation it is not a clear fit in most cases.
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Despite the appearance of certainty and law-like behavior of variables within models, the
lack of general laws in the human aspects of information systems phenomena makes
classification of models as covering law explanations inadequate. Finally, although functional
phenomenon (e.g. evolution) can be modeled, most mathematical models are built to predict
specific outcomes under a known set of conditions and do not contain the post hoc goal
orientation of functional explanations.
The difficulties in unambiguously fitting mathematical models into the theories of
scientific explanations used in this research lead us to treat such papers as a separate category.
This classification indicates that mathematical models do not fit the standard theories of
explanation and leaves the question of whether such models are explanatory for future
discussion.
Research Study
To understand explanation in Information Systems, a review of published research
literature in two IS Journals in the years 1990-91 and 2000-01 was conducted. Target journals
were Information Systems Research (ISR) and Management Information Systems Quarterly
(MISQ). These journals are consistently ranked as the top two IS journals and provide a suitable
sample for focusing attention on the differences between research explanations. Non-consecutive
years of publication were selected to provide a longitudinal view across a ten-year span and
allow changes to be tracked. The total number of articles reviewed (167) is consistent with
previous literature describing characteristics of IS (e.g. DeLone and McLean 1992; Orlikowski
and Iacono 2001).
The primary classification and sub-classification of articles was based on the type of
explanation presented earlier and shown in Tables 1 and 2. The ontological perspectives
described in §2 and research method for each study were also coded. Research methods are from
Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991) and include experimental, case study, survey, field study, mixed
method, instrument development, and action research. The duration of the research: crosssection/snapshot, multiple snapshot, and longitudinal was also recorded.
Although assignment of explanation types to individual papers was usually clear, some
cases were ambiguous, requiring interpretation due to the difficulty in specifying exact
classification boundaries and the presence of multiple explanatory elements in some studies. For
example, some pragmatic explanations relied extensively on statistical analysis (and vice versa)
and some mathematical models relied on extensive description of the phenomena. Other
combinations of overlaps also occurred. In these cases we interpreted the primary purpose of the
research (e.g. was the paper presenting a model with a description of the problem or was the
research testing a model and presenting statistical evidence?).
Coding was performed by three coders. Two primary coders were responsible for coding
the entire data set and a “coding moderator” resolved differences between the primary coders
(DeLone and McLean 1992). Two coders were faculty as major research universities and one
was a fourth year doctoral student. The two coders and the moderator met regularly over the
course of nine months to discuss and resolve ontological, explanatory, and methodological
differences coded from the articles. The rate of coding agreement is shown in Table 3.
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Coded Category
Explanation Type
Explanation Subclass
Ontology
Research Method
Research Duration

Percent Agreement
79%
86%
91%
92%
90%

Table 3. Coding Agreement
Findings
The goal of this work is to stimulate reflection on the types of explanations provided by
research in Information Systems. The research demonstrates that IS research articles have a
variety of distinct investigative purposes and produce different types of explanation. There were
three research types represented in this sample (Table 4); 49 articles present either designs for
systems, frameworks for research or mathematical models (30% of total articles). These research
articles were not intended to produce explanatory results of the types distinguished by the
philosophy of science but rather present artifact designs, research programs or representations
(models) of phenomena. Therefore, these articles were not coded for sub classifications,
ontology, research methods or durations.
Of the articles whose purpose was to present discovery of explanations of IS phenomena,
descriptions/structural explanations (41%) and statistical relevance explanations (59%) dominate
the types represented. Over the four years of articles in the twelve-year span examined, the
percentage of descriptions decreased (from 30% to 20%) and researchers relied more heavily on
statistical analysis of factors (28% increasing to 42%). Pragmatic explanations (15%), which are
differentiated based upon the explicit reliance on contrast classes, frequently rely on statistical
methods of analysis. If these articles are classified on that basis, the reliance on statistical
relevance is more dominant. But the slight increase in occurrence of pragmatic explanations may
be due in part to explicit comparison between contrast classes (e.g. “Why system X rather than
System X*”) and increasing interest in specific aspects of systems (e.g. “Why did these users
adopt the system” vs. “Why did these users adopt this system rather than that one.”)
There are few occurrences of functional explanation despite the goal-orientation of
information systems. This may be due, in part, to the emphasis in IS on prediction and
intervention. Functional analysis may represent a useful perspective particularly for explanations
of phenomena influenced by human intentionality or modeled as evolutionary processes.
Additionally, 76 (64%) of studies were explanation sketches providing only some
relevant variables. The percentage of explanation sketches increased from 58% to 69% of all
explanatory research between the two time periods. Since these studies identify only some of the
factors involved in the phenomena, they represent an opportunity for further research that can
provide more complete explanations and for research to produce more parsimonious, nomothetic
explanations.
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Explanation
Type

Other
research

Subclassification

Description/Structural
Covering Law
Statistical Relevance
Pragmatic
Functional
Framework/Model
Mathematical Model
Total

1990-1991
24 (30%)
0 (0%)
23 (28%)
6 (7%)
2 (2%)
21 (26%)
5 (6%)
81(100%)

2000-2001
17 (20 %)
0 (0%)
36 (42%)
9 (10%)
1 (1%)
17 (20%)
6 (7%)
86 (100%)

Total
41 (25%)
0 (0%)
59 (35%)
15 ( 9%)
3 (2%)
38 (23%)
11 (7%)
167 (100%)

Partial
Sketch
Nomothetic
Ideographic
Total

2 (4%)
32 (58%)
5 (9%)
16 (29%)
55(100%)

0 (0%)
44 (69%)
7 (11%)
13 (20%)
64 (100%)

2 (2%)
76 (64%)
12 (10%)
29 (25%)
119 (100%)

1990-1991
37 (69%)

2000-2001
56 (92 %)

Total
93 (81%)

9 (17%)

1 (2 %)

10 (9%)

8 (15%)

4 (7%)

12 (10 %)

1 (<1%)

2 (<1%)

3 (<1%)

0%
55 (100%)

0%
63 (100%)

0%
118 (100%)

10 (18%)
12 (22%)
11 (20%)
8 (15%)
7 (13%)

17 (28%)
13 (20%)
14 (22%)
7 (11%)
2 (3%)

28 (24%)
25 (21%)
25 (21%)
15 (13%)
9 (8%)

3 (6%)

0 (0 %)

3 (3%)

4 (7%)
55 (100%)

10 (16%)
63 (100%)

14 (12%)
118 (100%)

36 (66%)

36 (58%)

73 (62%)

4 (7%)
15 (27%)
55 (100%)

7 (11%)
20 (31%)
63 (100%)

11 (9%)
35 (30%)
118 (100%)

Table 4. Explanation Types

Ontology

Research
Method

Duration

Positivist
Positivist
(Narrative)
Interpretivist
Positivist &
Interpretivist
Critical Theory
Total
Experiment
Case Study
Survey
Field Study
Mixed Method
Instrument
Development
Other
Total
Snapshot/Crosssection
Multi-snapshot
Longitudinal
Total

Table 5. Ontologies, Research Methods, and Durations

©2005 Sprouts 3(3) pp 169-187 http://sprouts.case.edu/2003/030308.pdf
Sprouts - http://sprouts.aisnet.org/3-15

180

HOVORKA, GERMONPREZ AND LARSEN/EXPLANATION IN INFORMATION SYSTEMS

Ontologies, research methodologies, and research durations from the sample are
presented in Table 5. Of the 93 (81%) articles that are positivist, 32 (31%) are
description/structural explanations. Of these descriptions, 10 (9%) are narrative descriptions with
no quantitative analysis. The appearance of interpretivist studies decreased (from 15% to 7%)
and few studies viewed the phenomenon from both perspectives. Overall these results are
consistent with results from previous studies of ontologies in IS (Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991).
Although there is a tendency for specific research methods to produce specific
explanation types (e.g. experiments result in statistical relevance explanations in 78% of the
papers), experiments can also result in descriptive, pragmatic and functional explanations.
Conversely, other research methods can also be used to produce statistical relevance
explanations (e.g. case study, survey, field study, mixed method). Explanatory outcomes are
unrelated to research durations. The lack of binding of specific explanatory outcomes to specific
research methods or research durations poses both opportunities and pitfalls for researchers.
Producing a richer set of explanations does not necessitate a change in method or duration. But at
the same time, changing methods does not necessarily avoid replicating previous explanations of
the phenomena. The relationship between explanation type, research method and research
duration is presented in Table 6.

Descriptive
Research
Method

Duration

Experiment
Case Study
Survey
Field Study
Mixed Method
Instrument
Development
Other
Total 118
Snapshot/Crosssection
Multi-snapshot
Longitudinal
Total 118

3 (11%)
18 (72%)
7 (28%)
7 (47%)
3 (33%)

Explanation Type
Statistical
Pragmatic
Relevance
21 (78%)
2 (7%)
2 (8%)
5 (20%)
14 (56%)
2 (8%)
5 (33%)
3 (20%)
5 (56%)
1 (11%)

Functional
1 (4%)
0
2 (8%)
0
0

1 (33%)

2 (67%)

0

0

3 (21%)

9 (64%)

2 (14%)

0

21 (30%)

38 (52%)

10 (14%)

3 (4%)

1 (9%)
20 (57%)

7 (67%)
13 (37%)

3 (27%)
2 (6%)

0
0

Table 6. Explanation Types, Research Method, and Research Durations
Lastly, while not directly related to explanation, the research showed that ontological
perspectives are not bound to specific research methods or durations. This supports the argument
that a pluralist methodology is possible within single ontological perspectives (Mingers 2001). It
is research methods, not ontology, that “focuses on different aspects of reality” (Mingers 2001, p.
241) and through mixed-methods a variety of explanations of particular phenomena can be
provided. Table 7 shows the ontology-research method relationship.
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Discussion
This study of explanation in Information Systems is informative in four ways. First, we
argued that the prescription of a singular “best practice” explanation type is not possible in the
interdisciplinary field of Information Systems. This thinking extends Simon (1969) who
suggested that specific disciplines carry specific explanation types used to describe phenomena
in the field. We contend that in order to fully understanding research phenomena and build
research streams in Information Systems, researchers should recognize parallel, supportive
explanation types from a variety of reference disciplines, whether natural science or computer
science. Not recognizing the varieties and limitations of explanations in research may lead to
confusion about the meaning and scope of research results.

Research
Method

Duration

Experiment
Case Study
Survey
Field Study
Mixed Method
Instrument
Development
Other
Total 115*

Ontology
Positivist
Interpretive
27 (26%)
0
19 (18%)
5 (41%)
25 (24%)
0
10 (10%)
5 (42%)
7 (7%)
0
3 (3%)

0

12 (12%)

2 (17%)

Snapshot/Cross64 (62%)
6 (50%)
section
Multi-snapshot
9 (8%)
1 (8%)
Longitudinal
30 (29%)
5 (42%)
Total 115*
* 3 studies not included in this total specifically
used both positivist and interpretive approaches
and varied methods or durations within the same
study

Table 7. Ontologies and Research Methods and Research Duration
Second, by explicating the language and terminology used in describing types of
explanation, we increase the understanding of what research results mean, both in terms of the
relationship of the results to the objective and interpreted world and of the scope and
completeness of the explanation. This provides additional criteria for assessing research results
and can lead to insights about future research. Additionally, we provide a clearer picture of the
variety of outputs produced in IS research by recognizing the distinction between research
intended to design systems and research intended to discover explanations of phenomena.
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Third, we demonstrate that the IS field is focused on the models of material and efficient
causation, which lies at the core of the natural science model. IS research is dominated by
positivist studies which predominantly produce statistical relevance explanation. These are
usually sketches of some of the variables related to phenomena. This reveals opportunities to
pursue more parsimonious nomothetic explanations focused on the variables or antecedents most
significant to the outcome. This study reveals opportunities to exploit other types of explanation
in the pursuit of fuller explanations. In particular, pragmatic explanations may be of interest to
practitioners who are interested in asking questions based on specific perspectives. Since the
field involves the study of goal-oriented systems, the pursuit of functional oriented research may
provide valuable insights.
Finally, this research shows that, although there is a propensity to produce specific types
of explanations after choosing specific ontologies and methods, the explanation type produced is
not determined by those perspectives. This presents opportunities and problems as researchers
seek to extend scientific understanding through triangulation or the mixing of methods. Mingers
(2001) presents arguments for “critical pluralism” in research programs to achieve greater
understanding of the phenomenon under investigation. His arguments are based upon the ability
to combine positivist and interpretive perspectives and utilize a variety of methods within these
perspectives. But the choice of method and perspective for subsequent research is not clear. It is
possible to unintentionally replicate previous explanations even with a different ontology and
different research methods. Analysis of the type of explanation provided by previous research
may present guidance for subsequent research and result in fuller explanation of the phenomena.
For example, a descriptive explanation of the phenomenon can provide background, show
boundaries and context of the research, and lay out the researcher’s relationship to the setting.
Subsequent experimental methods may provide a statistical relevance explanation sketch of
certain variables related to phenomena within the context. This may be followed by survey or
interview based research providing pragmatic explanation of specific aspects of the phenomena
in a parsimonious (nomothetic) manner. Each aspect of the research is guided by the explanation
provided in preceding work and in aggregate this process provides a fuller explanation than any
single piece of research.
To illustrate the critical pluralism approach with regard to explanation types, research
streams within Information Systems can be built on the variety of explanation types produced as
a basis for deepening scientific understanding of particular phenomena. Early work on media
richness theory was based on predictive ability and the formation of generalizable laws
(covering-law/nomothetic explanation). The theory proposed that media have specific structural
characteristics that define the ability of the media to reduce equivocality or uncertainty. The
original framework defined the relationship between media channels and equivocal and uncertain
tasks and was later extended to predict how organizational design can support information needs
(Daft and Lengel 1984). Later work extended media richness theory by accounting for the role
social influence and organizational context played in defining media richness (see Schmitz and
Fulk 1991; Markus 1994; Lee 1994). These examinations showed how an apparently simple
information request was actually a message rich with information and subtle meaning and these
studies generally represented pragmatic/ideographic explanations where single instances of
media richness were explained through contextually dependent environments. Media richness
was then examined by Ngwenyama and Lee (1997) who applied the critical theory ontology to
the work of Daft and Lengel (1984) and Markus (1994). Ngwenyama and Lee effectively used a
new ontological perspective through which a new theory of media richness was developed (pg.
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163). Resembling the pragmatic/ideographic explanation used in the earlier social influence
studies, the Ngwenyama and Lee study actually distanced itself from earlier media richness work
through new theory development. This allows for what appears to be the “reuse” of the same
explanation type to actually be a unique instance of an explanation type in the investigation of
new theory.
These research projects formed a collective research stream through which media
richness theory was examined from different ontological perspectives, using different methods
and producing different types of explanation. Further studies are needed to identify research
streams in Information Systems and the types of explanation that has been provided across the
studies. This would give researchers a detailed understanding of how phenomena within that
stream are explained in addition to identifying the ontology and methods used. Identifying gaps
in the way phenomena are explained provides researchers new avenues through which to
advance scientific understanding and shape the evaluative criteria, identified problems, models
and exemplars of the IS disciplinary matrix.
Both the academic and practitioner communities will benefit from understanding the
scope of research explanations and the implications for the relevance of research. By examining
explanation types and associated terminology and showing the relationships between
explanations, ontologies and methods, researchers are better equipped to understand what the
research literature and their own research is, in fact, explaining.
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